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This report documents an analytical model to assist in the planning of the Operational 
Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of the Marine Corps' prospective Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The model's emphasis is on suitability issues such as 
Operational Availability in an on-land (after ocean transit) mission region. The model 
predicts strong sensitivity to the form of an assumed distribution of times to vehicle 
breakdown, and hence recommends that appropriate test data be obtained to reveal that 
form (the mean alone is inadequate). Removal of design faults likely to cause early 
failures is encouraged. 
The AAAV design is for a relatively lightweight but technologically advanced 
(mobile and lethal) amphibious vehicle that operates in platoons. If individual vehicles 
break down they must often be transported for repair, for example, to their point of 
origin, a ship. One option is to allow another platoon member to tow; another is to assign 
an auxiliary vehicle to transport. Such duties may seriously diminish the platoon 
productive mission availability (the towing/transport agents may themselves fail). OT&E 





This report documents dynamical and probabilistic models to assist in planning the 
Operational Testing of the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The 
model is programmed in rapidly executable software available from the authors; it runs on a 
personal computer (PC to readers of this report). The software allows an analyst to quantitatively 
study the sensitivity of the operational availability of one (or more) platoons, each of 12 vehicles. 
Among sensitive features or properties are: 
• The statistical nature (inferred distribution, not just the mean) of the times from a repair 
completion to subsequent failure. For sensitivity to distribution form see Sections 4 and 6. 
• The times to repair failed vehicles (including the often significant time and resources 
required to transport those vehicles to the repair facilities). 
• The numbers, types, and concepts of employment (COE) of the necessary support 
vehicles (e.g., landing craft and helicopters).  
The motivation is this:  modern military equipments tend to be designed to be lighter, more 
transportable, and quickly mobile, but also more combat effective than their predecessors. An 
example is the Marine Corps AAAV, which is intended to replace the present Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAV). Although it is smaller than the AAV, the new AAAV is faster and more 
technologically advanced. It possesses more sophisticated sensors and more lethal weaponry and 
is expected to be more combat effective than the present AAV.  
Such technological improvements are, however, likely to be characterized, at least initially, 
by increased fragility, and certainly less self-contained on-board sustainment (repair) capability. 
For the AAAV, the advanced technology that results in greater speed and lethality comes at the 
expense of external support requirements in case of onboard equipment failures (e.g., of sensors 
and communications gear), and particularly in case of mechanical breakdowns. In general, 
Operational Testing of new, sophisticated, potentially highly capable and effective, but 
potentially failure-prone assets should be done in the context of their entire essential support 
system. Such tests, if done entirely in the field, are costly and time-consuming at best. 
Consequently, a trustworthy, model-based preview of the entire system in operational action 
should be of great suggestive value. Focused, smaller-scale tests along with appropriate data 
acquisition and analysis, can be used iteratively to parameterize overall models; such Model-Test-
Model philosophy and practice promise to enlighten decision-makers judgments concerning the 
new systems likely operational contribution. This report describes such an approach, and 
quantitative results from them. 
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1. Problem Setting 
The purpose of this paper is to formulate a model for the operational analysis of a 
group of mobile amphibious vehicles that co-operate on-land in a remote location, having 
been launched from the sea (littoral/ocean). The specific application is to preview and 
extend or enhance Operational Test and Evaluation of the Marine Corps Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), but the model capability and usefulness extends 
beyond that objective. In particular, the model can be used to analyze logistical and 
maintenance support required to carry out an operation in a timely manner. The model is 
implemented in software, obtainable from the authors, which is executable on a personal 
computer.  The software is used to illuminate logistical and maintenance issues.   
Suppose a platoon of n (e.g., n = 12) nominally identical amphibious vehicles  
(AV here an abbreviation for the AAAV, but also for other vehicle types), begins at time  
t = 0, to traverse an ocean or littoral environment towards a beach/shoreline (B) a 
distance d (miles) away from a mother ship (MS) source. Operating at high speed, the 
vehicles are designed to travel at speed VT (in miles per hour, which may vary, depending 
on sea state, etc.). The ideal is that they reach their first destination, B, without 
interruption; this ideal is unrealistic, so there is subsequent discussion of failures and 
recovery during transit and their impact on arrival time at the B. At this point, they 
prepare to become land vehicles by activating a tread system and effectively becoming 
the rough, functional equivalent of Army Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). Their 
individual payloads are platoons of Marines. The AVs are of smaller capacity than APCs, 
and are less well armored, but carry more sophisticated payloads (sensors, 
communications, and weapons). They carry out operational assignments on land, and 
eventually return to a destination and begin again. See Buckles (1999) for further 
discussion and references. 
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1.1  Reliability Considerations 
Realistically, the AV is made up of failure-prone subsystems:  propulsion, drive train, 
navigation, communications, weapons, etc.; and each subsystem may well contain one or 
more design faults that cause failure. Failures of any of these subsystems in transit 
degrades the mission capability of the AV, and hence of the AV platoon. 
The impact of some failure modes differs from others:  certain failures of the engine 
or drive train, or other major propulsion system elements, incapacitate a platform, 
rendering it immobile or quiescent (dead in the water), and require the platforms 
removal to a maintenance facility. The Marine passengers are also transferred off during 
such a phase. Other failures, for instance of a sensor or part of the navigation system, 
may allow the platform to keep up with the remainder of the platoon, but in less than 
fully capable condition. A quiescent period may end after a delay when an auxiliary 
vehicle delivers spare parts. The present sophisticated design of an AV platform appears 
to make a great many different failures potentially possible, or even likely, and to require  
off-platform assistance for rectifying such failures. Thus, the failure-recovery subsystem 
cannot be ignored, and should itself be tested as part of the overall system. Runs of the 
proposed models will help to indicate the effects of unreliability upon overall end-to-end 
operational availability. Operational data acquisition during Operational Testing (OT) can 
thus be suggested. 
1.2 Purpose of the Paper 
The major objective of this paper is to reveal the sensitivities of overall AV system 
operational effectiveness to failure events and alternative concepts of a recovery-repair 
operation. It will be seen that the basic system of platforms, a platoon, is one of 
potentially mutually dependent subsystems, the platforms themselves plus auxiliary 
support. It can also be seen that if the basic system is realistically expanded to include 
support agents such as landing craft and helicopters, that themselves have competing 
operational functions, then the major surface and airborne subsystems can exhibit strong, 
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interrelated dynamics caused by reliability-maintainability system properties and 
requirements. Thus, careful acquisition and analysis of OT data is essential to show that 
there is an acceptable overall system performance when such an interdependent system is 
finally delivered to the ultimate users.   
Since it is unlikely that an entire platoon of AVs and its support system will be 
operationally tested, it is important that evaluation be supported by comprehensive 
and adequate system-levels models, and that these models be parameterized in a 
manner consistent with field experience. 
2. Model Outline 
Preliminary simplified models are presented, in which numbers of individual 
platforms in various conditions, so-called states, are represented as functions of each 
other, and of elapsed time measured from platoon launch from the MS. The basic 
structure of the initial model (D-1) is chosen to illustrate a plausible, dynamic version 
that can be interpreted as a rough expected value (or deterministic fluid) model. A 
better model would be stochastic, i.e., crafted to explicitly represent variability in, say, 
the times between platform failures and times to repair failed platforms. A simplified, 
analytically tractable stochastic model (S-1) is provided here. A related, more detailed 
model, to be investigated by computer simulation (Monte Carlo), will be the subject of a 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) OR thesis by Capt Jesse A. Kemp, USMC. 
Next follows a flow chart for the transitions of platforms/vehicles among their various 
states, as recognized in the quite simplified models (D-1) and (S-1). Note:  In (D-1) we 
ignore the effects of explicit distance or range from the MS. Spatial considerations will 
be brought in subsequently, and are explicitly present in the Kemp thesis. 
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2.2 State Variables  
A(t): Number of active, mission-capable vehicles in the ocean-littoral 
transitioning at high surface (planing) speed across water at time t. 
L(t): Number of unavailable (i.e., in transport service) auxiliary vehicles,  
e.g., landing craft of type LCU(R) (here abbreviated LC), in the Littoral 
ocean at time t. Note:  Available LCs number L  L(t) for the present, L 
being the total number available. There are other types of LCthe 
LCAsthat are not capable of towing broken-down AVs. They are not 
considered at this point. 
QT(t): Number of quiescent AVs (e.g., immobile or dead in the water), and 
those not fully mission-capable at time t. These are destined to be 
transported, or otherwise proceed at low speed, to either the MS or the B 
for repair. 
RA(t): Number of AVs under transport by a companion AV towards the MS  








Slow Motion → Beach (B) 
For Repair 
Littoral: 
Slow Motion →  
Mother Ship (MS)  





MS to B 
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(the tow-er alive, the tow-ee dead)). Also note that this number can 
always be zero if, by edict, AVs do not tow.  
RL(t): Number of AVs under transport by an auxiliary agent (e.g., landing craft, 
such as an LCU(R)) towards the MS.  
FA(t): Number of AVs under transport (here tow) by another AV towards the B 
(forward) at t (again, this counts individuals in pairs). Note that this 
number can be zero. AVs may not tow, or may do so only if LCs (LCUs or 
LCU(R)s) are all busy transporting other failed AVs, or are engaging in  
other activities. 
FL(t): Number of AVs under transport by an auxiliary agent (e.g., landing craft) 
towards the B. 
MS(t): Number of AVs undergoing or awaiting (queuing for) maintenance on the 
MS at t. 
MB(t): Number of AVs undergoing or awaiting maintenance on the B at t. 
B(t): Number of operational AV platforms accumulated on the B at t. Some 
have arrived without failure (perhaps after being towed to the MS, 
repaired and relaunched); some have experienced maintenance on the B 
after arriving there. 
2.3 Parameters 
Here are parameters minimally describing the dynamic evolution of the system of 
platforms, as it transitions (planes) from the MS to the B. 
λ: Failure rate per platform while running at fast speed; 1/ λ is the mean 
time to failure (MTTF), measured from any time point at which a 
platform is up and running. (Units are 1/time = e.g., 1/hours). Note:  The 
value of λ  may depend upon speed, sea state, condition of the littoral 
ocean environment, and other explanatory variables; this can be written as 
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λ •b g . Further, a model that permits infant mortality (early post-launch 
failure) can easily be adapted from the present setup. Exercise of the 
resulting model will show the possible considerable sensitivity of 
outcomes to a natural departure from the usual constant-failure-rate  
(exponential) assumption. 
pi: Probability of infant failure, meaning that a platform fails after launch, 
to attain planing speed. It, therefore, immediately joins a queue of AVs 
awaiting maintenance at the MS. 
vPA: Rate at which quiescent/failed AVs are picked up (placed under transport, 
i.e., towed) by fellow AVs (this can be omitted/made zero, thus 
eliminating the AV-tow option by setting vPA = 0). (Units are 1/time =  
e.g., 1/hours). 
vPL: Rate at which quiescent/failed vehicles are picked up (placed under 
transport, i.e., towed) by auxiliary vehicles (e.g., LCs, such as  
the LCU(R)). 
vP = vPA  + vPL: Total rate of tow-er pickup by tow-ee. 
vT: Rate at which individual platforms reach the B; 1/vT  is the mean 
time to transition to the B while in planing motion (given that no 
failure occurs). (Units are 1/time = e.g., 1/hours). vT can be set 
equal to VT/d to calibrate the present model to one with 
deterministic motion, distance to the beach d, speed velocity VT, 
and no failures (see Section 4 for related discussion). 
µS(): Rate at which the MS maintenance facilities can return a failed 
platform to fully active capability.  
Note 1:  For the present, MS maintenance is treated as a saturable, 
single-server repair system.  
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Note 2:  When there is infant mortality, i.e., pi>0, and a platform 
fails essentially just after being launched, then the effective repair 
rate, µ s •b g , equals an actual repair rate multiplied by the 
probability that no infant failure occurs: 
µ µs i sp∑ = - ∑b g b g b g1 # ; 
in other words, the effective mean repair time (effective repair time 
random variable is denoted by Reff ) with infant failures present, 
with probability pi, is  
E ER R ieff p= −/ 1b g . 
This is because an average of 1 1/ − pib g  repair times must be 
performed before the infant-failure mode is avoided (the present 
model does not allow for that modes permanent removal; see 
Gaver et al. (2000) for plausible reliability growth alternatives). 
Further Note:  The • notation refers to the influence of other 
variables, such as feedback, to enhance service if a big backlog 
develops. The default in all cases is a constant parameter value. 
µB(): Maintenance rate at the B. 
pAR(): Probability that a failed vehicle is towed to the MS (reverse) by a 
fellow AV (two AVs in complex, one alive and one dead). 
pAB(): Probability that a failed vehicle is towed to the B by a fellow AV. 
Note:  pAR()  +  pAB() = 1. 
pLR(): Probability that a failed vehicle is transported to the MS (reverse) 
by an auxiliary vehicle (e.g., LC).   
pLB(): Probability that a failed vehicle is transported to the B by an 
auxiliary vehicle (e.g., LC). Note:  pLR()  +  pLB() = 1. 
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vRA: Rate at which a towed vehicle complex (two AVs, one alive and 
one dead) reaches the MS; 1/ vRA is the mean time for the towed 
complex to reach the MS. 
vRL: Same, when transport is by auxiliary vehicles (e.g., LC). 
vBA: Rate at which a towed vehicle complex reaches the B; 1/ vBA is the 
mean time for the towed complex to reach the B. 
vBL: Same, when transport is by auxiliary vehicles (e.g., landing craft). 
L: Total number of landing craft used for AV recovery (LCU(R)s, not 
to be confused with LCACs) available in the ocean littoral (assume 
fixed for present). 
 
Simplification 1. Pyramiding/cascading failure possibilities are not modeled here. If 
a failed and quiescent vehicle must be transported or towed without failure, it is 
presumed transported or towed to the MS or to the B, depending upon which destination 
is perceived as the best from the viewpoint of total vehicle soonest availability at the B 
waypoint. The problem is potentially made more complex by the possibility that 
previously failed towed vehicle complexes (e.g., two AVs, or an AV and LC, may be 
ahead of a new breakdown, and hence virtually queued up ahead of that breakdown in 
time). Consequently, a breakdown that occurs near the MS might still be advantageously 
towed to the B if there are other (higher priority) transported or towed complexes between 
the current breakdown and the MS.  
Simplification 2. It is assumed here that a transported or towed complex does not 
break down between its origin point and destination (MS or B). This is optimistic, and 
calls for future amendment, although the model then becomes more complex and difficult 
to manage. Failures that are not total breakdowns can be handled in terms of the  
current model. 
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Simplification 3. For the purposes of this discussion it will simply be assumed that if 
a breakdown/failure occurs it is towed to the MS with probability pR, and to the B with 
probability pB, where  refers to the tow-er type pAR(), , pLB() (see 2.3). A 
convenient, but very preliminary assumption is that these probabilities are 1/2. However, 
it is clear that more realistic probabilities should depend minimally on the time that has 
elapsed since platoon launch from the MS; the probabilities can also be made to depend 
upon repair backlogs and delays, possibly due to past availability at the two possible 
destinations. In general, a more refined description of the system state should lead to a 
better decision, but at a cost in model complexity.   
Clearly the decision as to where to tow the failed AV should ultimately depend upon 
how soon it can be in service near (e.g., inland of) the B. 
Simplification 4. The mean time to be towed to either the MS or the B should depend 
systematically and predictably upon the actual breakdown location, although in practice 
there may be great variability. As a surrogate, the mean time could depend on elapsed 
time, t; presumably as elapsed time t increases, the distance of the platoon from B 
decreases (but not if early breakdowns persistently occur near the MS, since the repair 
facility there may become overloaded). Our present assumption of a constant mean time 
is thus crude, since it merely represents an order-of-magnitude delay. The assumption can 
be relaxed by segmenting the Littoral region into several range bands from the MS to the 
B (and beyond), and counting platforms in various states in each. This refinement 
proliferates the state equations, and is left for a second round of modeling. It will 
subsequently be shown that the simple Markovian type of fluid model presented here, is 
in quite good agreement with a more limited, but stochastic, model. 
Many of the simplifications mentioned have been avoided in a Monte Carlo computer 
simulation model implemented by Capt Jesse. A. Kemp (USMC) as part of his Masters 
thesis in Operations Research. 
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3. Deterministic Analytical (Mathematical) Model (D-1) 
Here is a set of dynamic stock-and-flow differential equations that describe the  
time-dependent numbers of AV platforms in the various states. The present model stops 
at the beach, i.e., at the B. The model is continued/amended in Section 4, to include the  
on-land mission segment. 
            
dA t
dt












of number of active
AVs in the Littoral
Rate of failure
of active AVs
Rate of tow initiation
for (broken
down) AVs
Rate of "free" active
AVs reaching B
Rate at which AVs under
maintenance at MS become
active in the Littoral
Rate at which AVs
under tow by fellow
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= − − −
+λ ν ν( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
 (3.2) 
Note:  L(t) = RL(t) + FL(t). Also, 0 ≤ L(t) ≤ L,  
                       so [L  L(t)]+ = max[L  L(t),0] 












where n is the number of AVs launched from the MS 
            
dR t
dt
p v Q t A t v R t v R tA AR PA T RA A RA A
b g b g
Rate of increase" of




Rate of initiation of
of tow (complex of two vehicles)
towards the MS
Rate of dropoff of
AVs for maintenance
at the MS
Rate of tow er
return to active
status, and to hover
rate towards the B
"
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
123 1 2444 34444
1 24 34 1 24 34




Note:  When an active vehicle picks up and tows a failed, quiescent vehicle, this means 
that two vehicles (AVs) form a complex and proceed at rate vPA. Hence, the 2. 
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dR t
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b g b g
Rate of increase" of
the number of AVs 
being transported to 
the MS by an auxiliary 
vehicle
Rate of pickup of failed
AVs by available landing
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dF t
dt
p Q t A t F t F tA AB PA T BA A BA A
b g b g
Rate of "increase"
of number of AVs
in tow ("forward") 
to the B
Rate of initiation of
tow (complex of 2 vehicles)
towards the B
Rate of dropoff for
maintenance at the
B
Rate of tow er
return to active
status
123 1 2444 34444
1 24 34 1 24 34
= • − −
−
2 ν ν ν( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
  (3.5) 
Note:  In this case, both tow-er and tow-ee remain at the B, but the tow-ee may enter 
repair, encountering delay. FA(t) counts both tow-ers and tow-ees. 
 
      
dF t
dt
p Q t L L t F tL LB PL T BL L
b g b g
Rate of "increase" of
number of AVs in tow
to B by LC
Rate of initiation of transport by LC Rate of dropoff
of LC tows at B
123 1 24444 34444
1 24 34
= • − −
+
ν ν( ) ( ) ( )    (3.6) 
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  (3.10) 
4. The On-Land Mission. Helicopters (For Transport and AV  
Rescue-Recovery). Model D-2. 
An important aspect of Marine-Navy cooperation to dominate and secure a land 
region from the sea is (in present concept) to use AVs and Helicopters (Hs for short), 
or some other mobile platform, cooperatively. A primary function of an H force is to 
transport personnel and supplies to inland points. An important secondary role is to 
support AVs, when the latter fail, while in the on-land mission phase. 
We now aim to more explicitly include in the model the contribution of Hs to AV 
dynamics, and ultimately to AV availability on the B. Conversely, we also study the 
impact of AV requirements for support on H availability. There will clearly be a tradeoff 
that can be dependent upon conflict conditions ashore. The present model does not reflect 
the time and event-dependent character of such needs, but only general trends that result 
from a consistent control policy. 
4.1 Augmentation of the Basic Model to Represent AV Operational Region 
(On-Land) Availability 
The focus here is on AVs that may fail when on land, and can be repaired on-site. 
This accounts, at least crudely, for the use of Hs to furnish needed parts to a stranded AV.  
Now consider the availability of AVs that have eventually and successfully reached 
the B, and undergone successful repair, if needed. The state variable B(t) of (3.10) counts 
that number at time t, provided none are yet dispatched to carry actual in-land operational 
missions. But, such are the ultimate objectives of the AVs, so we now add features to the 
model to represent this phase of the AV operational cycle. 
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4.2 Additional State Variables 
These augment those of Section 2.2 to represent on-land conditions (the subscript O 
denotes this on-land operational phase throughout): 
AO(t):  Number of active, mission-capable vehicles (AVs) on land, transitioning 
among waypoints at time t. These are assumed to be failure-prone with 
rate λO •b g . 
QO(t):  Number of failed, quiescent AVs (e.g., in place on land) and not fully 
mission capable at t. These require recovery assistance; we assume it is 
furnished on site by helicopters or other support vehicles. Other vehicles 
(e.g., for transport) can also be accommodated in the model, but are  
not here. 
Let there be h (e.g., five or 10) helicopters (Hs) or other mobile support vehicles 
exclusively dedicated to assist failed on-land AVs.  
Let  
Ho(t):  Number of Hs outgoing to assist failed AVs at t. 
Hi(t):  Number of Hs incoming from having assisted an on-the-spot repairable 
AV, at t.  
Note:  It is assumed here that H transit times, both outbound and incoming, are much 
greater than the time on site, which is taken to be negligible. 





λO •b g:  The failure rate of AVs on land. As before, the notation •  
stands for the influence of explanatory variables, such as terrain 
state and speed of advance. Here the default is a constant. 
νHo •b g: Rate at which outbound Hs encounter failed/quiescent AVs  
on land. 
ν Hi •b g:  Rate at which inbound Hs return to H pool, and become available 
for reassignment to AV recovery. 
ν L •b g:  Rate at which active AVs leave mission region (return to the B or 
reach a destination); 1/ν L  is the mean mission duration. 
Note:  The h Hs are considered to be exclusively assigned to provide on-land, on-site 
recovery assistance to failed AVs. They are themselves assumed immune to crashes and 
failures (an unrealistically optimistic assumption in hostile territory, but one that can be 
relaxed). They are also assumed to make only one tripand that successfulper  
failed AV. 
 Let  
m B t t t¢ £ ¢ £b gc h, 0 :   (Denotes) the rate at which available AVs on the B enter on-land 
mission status at time t. 
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+ ∑
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from those on B
Rate of failure of
active on-land AVs
Rate of depletion 
of AVs in 
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= - ∑ + ∑ν λ
Rate of H-assisted recovery of
failed-quiescent AVs
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b g b g b g b g b g b g b g b g
123 1 2444 3444 1 244444 3444444
= - ∑ + ∑ - -ν λ
Rate of H-assisted 
recovery of failed AVs 
(rate of outgoing H 
release)
Rate of launch of Hs in response to failures
  (4.3) 
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Q t H t H ti H O o H io i
b g b g b g b g b g b g
123 1 2444 3444 1 24 34
= • − •ν ν
Rate of H-assisted 
recovery of failed AVs 
(rate of outgoing H 
release)
Rate of return of Hs 
to base      (4.4)  
4.4 AV Beach Accumulation and Land Mission  
Although the platoon of n (e.g., n=12) AVs departs from the MS essentially as a 
concentrated group, its members accumulate gradually at the B. In the fluid 
approximation model used here, the accumulated number on the B approaches, but never 
actually reaches, n; this is because a continuous fluid approximation is being used. We 
adopt the convention that all AVs are effectively at the B when B(t) reaches nfm , where 
0 1< ≤fm , but fm  is taken to be large, e.g., 0.95 or 0.99 (choice of the analyst). At this 
point, the on-land platoon-strength mission is launched. 
Thus, (a) calculate the launch time, tm : 
 B t nfm mb g = ; 
then (b) begin integrating (4.1) at t tm=  and invoke the initial condition A t nfO m mb g = , so 
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4.5  Upper Bound on Number Available During On-Land Mission Segment 
In order to obtain a deterministic upper bound on the on-land availability of the 
platoon, pick f nm = −1 1 2/ , which stops B tb g  accumulation when B t nmb g = −1 2/ , an 
approximation to the mean first-passage time to n. Thus, (a) launch a mission at  
tm , where 
 B t nt nm mb g = = - 1 2/ , 
and use the initial condition A t nO mb g = . Then, (b) solve (4.1)  (4.4). These define  
Initial Conditions (II). 
The two simple initial conditions specified in Subsections 4.4 and 4.5, allow the 
general term in B t t t¢ £ ¢ £b gc h,0  in (4.1) to be omitted; integration starts at time tm  with a 
given level of platoon strength. Note:  The above specifies a particular and plausible 
initial condition for the on-hand mission segment of the AV platoon. Other modes of 
dispatch of the AVs into the on-land environment can be represented by  
straightforward changes.  
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4.6 Numerical Illustration of the Sensitivity of Operational Availability to the 
Form/Shape of the Time-to-Failure Distribution 
 In this subsection we compare results for an exponential time to failure to those of a 
mixed failure time distribution, in which there is a probability pi that the failure time is 0 
and a probability (1-pi) that the failure time is exponential. The exponential and the 
mixed exponential have the same means, but their shapes are different. The deterministic 
model of Sections 3 and 4 is used. There are 12 AVs in a platoon. Model parameters 
common to all the cases are as follows: 
AVs traveling to the B: 
Distance from the MS to the B = 40 nautical miles (nm) 
All failed AVs in water are towed back to the MS 
AV velocity in water = 25nm/hr 
Towing velocity in water = 5nm/hr 
If an AV does not fail, the time to reach the B is 1.6 hours 
Arrival rate at the B, ν T = =25 40/ 0.625 
Towing rate back to the MS if failed, ν PA = 5/20 = 0.25 
Stop at the B until 10 of the AVs are available at the B; then the available AVs start 
the land portion of mission  
AVs on Land: 
Distance from the B to last destination = 100nm 
AV velocity on land = 25nm/hr 
Travel time on land without failure = 4 hours 
There are five waypoints; an AV pauses 10 minutes at each waypoint 
Total time spent at waypoints = 50 min. 
AVs are subject to failure at the waypoints 
Total time an AV transits on land if no failure = 4.83 hours 
Rate at which an AV arrives at land destination, ν L  = 1/4.83 = 0.21 
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Helicopter: 
Velocity = 50nm/hour 
Mean time to fly to failed AV = (40+(100/2))/50 = 1.8 hours 
There is a two-hour administrative logistic down time (ALDT) prior to each H 
mission to repair a failed AV on land 
Rate of arrival of an H from the MS to a failed AV,ν Hi  = 1/(2+1.8) = 0.26 
Rate of return of an H to the MS, ν Ho = 1/1.8 = 0.56 
There are two Hs 
Results for the following AV time to failure models are compared; all models for time 
to failure for an AV have a mean of 72 hours. Two of the failure-time models have infant 
failure modes as described in Section 3. 
Exponential model: 
Mean time to failure=72 hours 
Mean repair time on the MS=three hours 
Failure rate, λ=1/72=0.014 
Rate of repair completion on the MS=1/3=0.33 
Initial condition:  all 12 AVs are available at time 0 
Mixed model 1:   
With pi = 0.25 the failure time is 0, and with probability (1-pi) = 0.75 the time to 
failure is exponential with mean 96 hours; the mean time to failure is 72 hours  
Failure rate, λ=1/96 = 0.010 
Rate of repair completion on MS (includes repair extensions due to additional failures 
at time 0) = 0.75/3 = 0.25 
Initial condition:  nine AVs are available at time 0, and three are waiting for or are 
being repaired. 
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Mixed model 2:   
With pi = 1/12 the failure time is 0, and with probability (1-pi) = 11/12 the time to 
failure is exponential with mean 78.5; the mean time to failure is 72 hours.  
Rate of repair completion on MS (includes repair extensions due to additional failures 
at time 0) = (11/12)/3 = 0.31 
Initial condition:  11 AVs are available at time 0, and one is being repaired.  
 The following figures display the accumulated mean number of AVs that arrive at the 
B; the mean number of AVs in repair at the MS; and the mean number of AVs in transit 
on land to the final land destination.  
Note:  The form of the failure distribution greatly influences the time at which the 
platoon reaches the final land destination. The assumption of a pure exponential 
distribution tends to be quite optimistic if an infant failure type of alternative holds. 
Conclusion:  OT data acquisition and analysis should allow a propensity for early 
failures, as compared to the exponential, to reveal itself. Automatic assumption of a 




Figure 1.   
Number of AVs in Repair at the Mother Ship (MS). 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 3.   
The Mean Number of AVs in Transit on Land. 
5.  A Stochastic Model for Platform Transit Time 
It is easily possible to extend the previous analytical model to a tractable stochastic 
version that allows for general (not just Markov/exponential constant failure rate) 
random times to failure. Restriction to the situation in which individual platforms operate 
independently is immediately tractable, and quite informative:  it shows quantitatively 
that the ultimate transit time to B, Td may be quite sensitive to the form of the time-to-
failure distribution. Facile, knee-jerk-conventional assumption of the exponential to 
describe time to breakdown, Td, can considerably understate the (expected) time for a 
platform to ultimately reach the B from the MS.  
Consequently, it is important to tabulate, study, and incorporate actual, 
observed times to platform failure, particularly those that require unanticipated 
early return to the MS, and subsequent repair and re-launch. An important 
objective of testing is to identify and remove the causes of such so-called infant 
failures.  
It can be seen intuitively that a particular mean time to failure can be consistent with 
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very long observations (sometimes called the infant mortality situation) and (b) an 
apparently exponential-like scatter, or (c) numerous alternatives. Clearly option (a), with 
its many repairs and re-starts, can radically extend the time to waypoint B by inducing 
many failures that must await assistance or return to the MS, experience maintenance and 
re-launch. An important exception occurs if, after each such infant short-time failure, a 
serious attempt is made to remove a design fault that causes the failure, and that attempt 
is successful (and does not somehow otherwise disrupt the design). This highly 
reasonable concept of design evolution and testing (test-analyze-fix-test) can, it is 
hoped, result in non-homogeneous time-to-failure data that exhibits a general increase in 
operating times to failure (so-called reliability growth). Certainly the summary of such 
data by a simple mean, and the invocation of a constant failure rate $ / ,λ = 1 mean  are 
overly simplistic and quite possibly misleading. (Note:  This indicates that our first model 
(D-1) of Section 3 must be viewed with caution; however, it can be readily altered to 
reflect infant mortality, or relatively many premature-compared-to-exponential failures). 
As was the case in Model (D-1), some failures are serious, and require slow transit, 
e.g., back to the MS, or forward to the B, for repair. This can be accomplished by towing 
by a fellow non-disabled AV, or transported by LCU(R), as represented in Model (D-1) 
in Section 3. In the present independent model, the failed AV is assumed to proceed 
under its own or totally independent power, or with LCU(R) transport assistance, so the 
AV platoon is not depleted for towing. This represents the situation in which there are 
always ample LCU(R)s or other vehicles for transport of failed AVs. Its failure-induced  
slow-return velocity is VR << VT. Minor (not serious) failures can, in principle, occur 
while a seriously failed AV is being returned to the MS, and thus adding the maintenance 
burden, and hence delay at the MS. An interesting Concept of Employment (COE) policy 
question is whether to (a) service on-site by LCU(R), minor on-site failures soon after 
occurrence, without transporting the AV to the MS or the B, or (b) to wait until the AV 
reaches the MS or the B, and service any serious failure and the accumulated minor 
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casualties at that time. Of course, the same issue arises if serious failures are towed to the 
B for repair:  should auxiliary, e.g., LCU(R), support be used to service minor failures as 
they occur (or en route), or should the service of accumulated minor plus serious failures 
be delayed until the B is reached? This latter COE reduces the burden on auxiliary 
vehicles, but might jeopardize partially disabled AV safety, and also potentially submits 
the auxiliary vehicles to failure. The control policy should depend, in part, upon current 
need for auxiliary vehicles for other missions, and on the maintenance backlog, hence 
delay at the MS or the B. Logistics (spare parts and diagnostics equipment) requirements 
must be considered as well, and may be addressed in terms of the current models and 
natural variations on them. Many such are possible and remain to be analyzed. 
5.1 Stochastic Model (S-1) 
Here is a simple stochastic model for recovery of a remotely failed AV during ocean 
transit. A single generic platform/vehicle travels at constant velocity VT (miles/hour) from 
the MS to the B, a distance d. This distance can be covered in precise time t = d/VT, 
unless there are interrupts caused by system failures, which we must account for.  
Note:  Here we assume that actual time of transit when/if no failures occur is a constant, 
whereas in the previous model that time is mean (of an exponential random variable). 
Notation 
Td: Random time for a representative platform to reach the B from the MS for 
the first time, having started at launch (time = 0), and possibly experienced 
various numbers of failures and repairs en route. Discovery of the 
probabilistic properties of this random variable is the objective of the 
model. Model runs can then guide analyses of alternative COEs. 
Tb: The random time, measured from a launch from the MS until 
breakdown/failure, while attempting to transit to the B; 
P{ } ( / ),Tb Tb> = − =t F t d VT1  where F bT ( )•  is the distribution of the 
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(arbitrary) time to breakdown (under stable design conditions), more 
generally F
bT ( ; ),• θ  where introducing a generic parameter θ can represent 
any quantified set of conditioning or explanatory variables, or it can 
represent a random environmental effect as well. A differently distributed 
Tb will prevail over land. The present model pertains to the  
ocean-crossing segment of the transit only. 
RO: Random time to rectify a failure that is susceptible to on-the-spot repair, 
given spare parts and diagnostic capability. This incorporates the time for, 
say, LC transit to the failed AV, and even possibly necessary revisits. 
RM: Random time to repair a serious failure that cannot be rectified on-site, 
i.e., must be removed to MS (here assumed to occur under own 
propulsion), but at (slow) velocity VR << VT. As will be discussed later, RM 
might include repair or minor failures that accumulated during the  
reverse motion. 
(Note:  We do not model here the option of a slow progress to the B  
for repair). 
Rm(T(0))≡ Rm(N(T(0))):  Random time to repair all minor failures (N(T(0))) in 
number) accumulated during generic random transit time T(0). This can 
represent (a) failures of sensors (FLIR) or communications equipment 
until breakdown (T(0)=Tb), or (b) (any such minor) failures 
accumulated during major-failure-free transit from the MS to the B, in 
time t=d/VT. 
5.2 The Basic Stochastic Model for Time from the MS to the B 
A platform/vehicle plans to travel at velocity, VT from the MS to the B, a distance d. 
If the vehicle breaks down before covering d, it proceeds at velocity (VR << VT) back to 
the MS, where it is repaired and re-launched. 
 27
Hence 
T R T T
































b g b g b g
b g
b g
 with probability 
where it is assumed that  minor failure repairs are
accumulated while in transit without serious failure.  These
are repaired at the B.








where we assume that minor failures occur Poisson-wise, until either trip completion or a 
serious breakdown occurs, inducing a re-start. Note:  It has been tacitly assumed here that 
minor failure repairs at the MS take the same amount of time as at the B. This certainly 
need not be true:  one can specify Rm, MS(t) and Rm, B(s) as being quite different  
random processes. 
 In (5.1), Td# refers to an independent random replica of Td. If failure-inducing fault 
removals occur, we obtain a system of such equations; this important feature is omitted 
for the present. 
Also in (5.1), the accumulated minor failure repair times can be modeled as a random 
sum of independent random variables, where the random number of summands depends 
upon the time of exposure until either the MS-B transit completes, or a breakdown and 
reverse transit occurs, starting at Tb. For time of exposure T(0)=x, and Ν y xb gm r,  0 y <£  
a Poisson process with rate ηm j∑b g,  and  a random minor failure service duration,S  










.        (5.2) 
Comments:  The above model formulation is illustrative and can readily be changed, 
although not without a price in additional model complexity. A simpler version would 
ignore all failures except the major ones, but require auxiliary transport. Such a version 
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already shows the amplifying impact of in-transit failures on overall measures of transit 
time, such as its mean, E dT . This effect becomes more pronounced if it becomes 
necessary to repair accumulated minor failures. It has alsoand importantlybeen 
assumed that such repairs can be accomplished flawlessly during the visit to the MS to 
repair any major failure, but clearly this may not occur. Also, in this model no attempt is 
made to explicitly represent delays in queue for repair at the MS. These delays can 
introduce a substantial increase in the time, Td, and hence an increase in the time until a 
platoon of n (here treated as independent and identical units) assembles at the B. The 
reader is reminded that the stochastic behavior of the individual vehicles (AVs) in a 
platoon is modeled as independent, which is the consequence of having plentiful support 
by LCU(R)s and by maintenance facilities at the MS and the B. Hence, results from the 
present model are almost certainly optimistic. They can, however, provide useful checks 
on more detailed simulation models. 
5.3 Expectation/Mean of Td 
A general formula for the expectation/mean of the time for an AV to complete the 
transit, Td , is obtained by conditional expectation from (5.1); first condition on Tb: 
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5.5 Special (Tractable) Case:  Poisson Minor Failures 
For illustration, let minor failures occur according to a stationary Poisson process, 
with rate λm, with repair durations S N Tj j, , ,... ( )= 1 2 0b gm r independently and identically 
distributed, and with mean E S .  
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;  (5.5) 
 
Note that the expectations with respect to Tb  are over the set 0 ≤ ≤Tb t , e.g., 
 
E t xdF xb
t
bT T; ;= z0 b g       (5.6) 
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this applies to the later expectations, E g tbTb g; , as well, with g ∑b g being an arbitrary 
function (of Tb).  
5.6 Exponentially Distributed Tb 
If Tb  is distributed exponentially with rate parameter λ (a very special case) then 
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For very small λ this gives 
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AVs in transit from the MS to the B may, in principle, break down and require 
transport back to the MS for repairs several times before successful transit is 
accomplished. The effect on eventual transit time Td, of such return-to-MS transports and 
re-repairs can become quite large; the time to (slowly) return for repairs adds to the total 
time, and the repairs congest the repair facility, adding delay. The present infant-failure 
model does not permit an early (infant) failure to get far from the MS, but it does 
compound the repair burden and increases turnaround delay, and therefore extends the 
transit time to the B. 
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6. Comparison of Deterministic and Stochastic Models 
In this section we compare results from the stochastic model and a simplified 
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In this model, all disabled AVs are towed back to the MS. There is always an LC 
available for towing. 
The corresponding stochastic model for one AV is that of (5.1), with the minor failure 
rates λm = 0. The variance of the time for a single AV to arrive at the B for the stochastic 
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and T Tb bF t F tb g b g= -1  
We approximate the distribution of the AV arrival time at the B for an exponential 
time to failure as follows:  if no failure occurs, then the time for an AV to reach the B is 




UVW1 exp λ .  
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and Z  has an exponential distribution with mean 
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KJ[ ] / . (6.8) 
Note that 
E X T= E d . 
The variance for the approximation (6.7) is  
 Var Var Var p E p pf f fX Y Z Z= = + -
2 1b g. (6.9) 
 
 The stochastic model corresponding to the deterministic model for multiple vehicles 
is that each of the vehicles travels independently to the B; all the AVs start at time zero. 
Thus the number of vehicles that have arrived at the B by time s has a binomial 
distribution, with number of trials being the number of AVs, and the probability of 
success being P sX £l q. 
6.1 Numerical Example 
Below are displayed results for a numerical example. The parameter values are: 
Deterministic Model: 
Rate of transit completion to the beach for a working AV is ν T = 20 25/  per hour 
Rate of commencing towing for failed AV is ν PL = 2 per hour 
Rate of tow completion to mother ship (MS) is ν RL = 1 5/  per hour 
Rate of repair for failed vehicle at MS is µ S = 0 5.  per hour 
Rate of failure for a working AV is λ = 1 3/  per hour 
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Stochastic Model: 
Distance to B, d is 25nm 
Planing velocity, VT, for a working AV is 20nm per hour 
Towing velocity, VR, to the MS is 5nm per hour 
Mean repair time at the MS is two hours 
Variance of a repair time at the MS is one hour2 
Mean time to serious failure is three hours  
 
We assume first that the time to a serious failure has an exponential distribution. If no 
serious failure occurs, then the time for an AV to reach the B is 1.25 hours. In the 
stochastic model, allowing for failures as above, the mean time for an AV to reach the 
beach, Τd , is 3.79 hours, and the standard deviation of the time is 4.59 hours. The 
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and Z  has an exponential distribution with mean 
 
 E E dZ T p f= −[ ] . / .125c h  (6.11) 
The mean of the approximate time is 3.79 hours, the same as that of Td. However, its 
standard deviation is 5.60 hours, which is 22% greater than that of Td. 
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Figure 4 below displays the mean and quantiles for the binomial stochastic model and 
the mean from the deterministic model. 
Comments:  It can be seen from Figure 4 that the deterministic and stochastic model 
means agree well when the time exceeds one hour. The stochastic model permits 
probability limits to be created; these suggest considerable variability in the number of 
platoon elements (AVs) that have arrived at the B by any fixed time t. For instance, at  
t = 6 hours, the probability that eight or more out of 12 have arrived is ª 95% , while the 
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Binomial Model (mean) 
Binomial Model:  smallest k s.t. Prob(B(t)<=k) >=0.05 
Binomial Model:  smallest k s.t. Prob(B(t)<=k) >=0.95 
Figure 4.  
Number of AVs at the Beach Time from Launch. 
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In the results displayed below we explore the effect of different distributions of the 
time to failure on the time for an AV to arrive at the B. We use the stochastic model of 
this section. We compare the mean and standard deviation of the arrival time at the B, Td, 
for times to serious failure having a mixed exponential distribution:  for x > 0, 
 
F x p e p eb
x x
T b g b g= - + - -- -1 1 11 2λ λ . (6.12) 
The following tables display the mean and standard deviations for the AV arrival 
times at the B. Note:  Once again, the form of the distribution of the time to serious 
failure can have a dramatic effect on the mean and standard deviation of the time to arrive 
at the B. The form of that distributionspecifically its tendency to exhibit small 
valueswill also influence logistics requirements, and their spatial location. Comparison 
of the mean and standard deviation of the operationally important time to arrive at the B, 
suggests that the eventual arrival time distribution, Td, will be approximately exponential 

















if No Failure 
Mean Time 




of Time to 
Arrive at 
Destination 
 (nm/Hour) (Hours) (Hours) (Hours) 
    
Exponential Mean 3 5 5.00 29.36 27.69 
 10 2.50 9.31 9.45 
 15 1.67 5.40 6.01 
 20 1.25 3.79 4.59 
 25 1.00 2.91 3.80 
 30 0.83 2.36 3.30 
 35 0.71 1.99 2.94 
 40 0.63 1.72 2.68 
Mixed Exponential Mean 3 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5 
5 5.00 25.85 23.81 
 10 2.50 11.38 11.40 
 15 1.67 7.26 7.91 
 20 1.25 5.29 6.21 
 25 1.00 4.15 5.20 
 30 0.83 3.41 4.53 
 35 0.71 2.89 4.05 
 40 0.63 2.50 3.68 
Table 1.  
Moments for Time of Individual AV to Arrive at Destination, Beach (B), which is  
25nm away. The velocity of return to Mother Ship (MS) if failed is five nm per 


















if No Failure 
Mean Time 




of Time to 
Arrive at 
Destination 
 (nm/Hour) (Hours) (Hours) (Hours) 
    
Exponential Mean 6 5 5.00 13.21 11.45 
 10 2.50 5.34 5.15 
 15 1.67 3.33 3.58 
 20 1.25 2.41 2.86 
 25 1.00 1.89 2.43 
 30 0.83 1.56 2.14 
 35 0.71 1.32 1.94 
 40 0.63 1.15 1.78 
Mixed exponential Mean 6 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/11 
5 5.00 14.86 12.57 
 10 2.50 8.32 8.17 
 15 1.67 5.81 6.33 
 20 1.25 4.45 5.24 
 25 1.00 3.56 4.51 
 30 0.83 2.97 4.00 
 35 0.71 2.54 3.63 
 40 0.63 2.22 3.33 
Table 2.  
Moments for Time of Individual AV to Arrive at Destination, Beach (B), which is  
25nm away. The velocity of return to Mother Ship (MS) if failed is five nm per 


















if No Failure 
Mean Time 




of Time to 
Arrive at 
Destination 
 (nm/Hour) (Hours) (Hours) (Hours) 
    
Exponential Mean 9 5 5.00 9.86 7.89 
 10 2.50 4.29 3.87 
 15 1.67 2.73 2.77 
 20 1.25 2.00 2.24 
 25 1.00 1.58 1.92 
 30 0.83 1.31 1.70 
 35 0.71 1.11 1.54 
 40 0.63 0.97 1.42 
Mixed exponential Mean 9 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/17 
5 5.00 12.48 10.04 
 10 2.50 7.52 7.30 
 15 1.67 5.41 5.88 
 20 1.25 4.18 4.95 
 25 1.00 3.39 4.32 
 30 0.83 2.84 3.85 
 35 0.71 2.44 3.50 
 40 0.63 2.14 3.22 
Table 3.  
Moments for Time of Individual AV to Arrive at Destination, Beach (B), which is  
25nm away. The velocity of return to Mother Ship (MS) if failed is five nm per 


























of Time to 
Arrive at 
Destination
 (nm/Hour) (Hours) (Hours) (Hours)
    
Exponential Mean 18 5 5.00 7.17 4.73
 10 2.50 3.34 2.52
 15 1.67 2.18 1.85
 20 1.25 1.62 1.51
 25 1.00 1.28 1.31
 30 0.83 1.07 1.17
 35 0.71 0.91 1.07
 40 0.63 0.79 0.98
Mixed exponential Mean 18 
p=0.5; λ1=1/30, λ2=1/6 
5 5.00 8.61 6.43
 10 2.50 3.97 3.44
 15 1.67 2.57 2.52
 20 1.25 1.90 2.06
 25 1.00 1.51 1.78
 30 0.83 1.25 1.58
 35 0.71 1.06 1.44
 40 0.63 0.93 1.33
Table 4.  
Moments for Time of Individual AV to Arrive at Destination, Beach (B), which is  
25nm away. The velocity of return to Mother Ship (MS) if failed is five nautical 
miles (nm) per hour; the mean repair time is two hours and the variance of the 
repair time is one hour. 
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